Appellate Jurisprudence in the Internet Age by Whiteman, Michael
Northwestern Journal of Technology and Intellectual Property
Volume 14 | Issue 3 Article 1
Winter 2017
Appellate Jurisprudence in the Internet Age
Michael Whiteman
Northern Kentucky University
This Article is brought to you for free and open access by Northwestern Pritzker School of Law Scholarly Commons. It has been accepted for inclusion
in Northwestern Journal of Technology and Intellectual Property by an authorized editor of Northwestern Pritzker School of Law Scholarly Commons.
Recommended Citation
Michael Whiteman, Appellate Jurisprudence in the Internet Age, 14 Nw. J. Tech. & Intell. Prop. 255 (2017).
https://scholarlycommons.law.northwestern.edu/njtip/vol14/iss3/1
Copyright 2017 by Northwestern University Pritzker School of Law Volume 14, Number 3 (2017) 
Northwestern Journal of Technology and Intellectual Property 
255
Appellate Jurisprudence in the Internet Age
By Michael Whiteman*
“Meet the new boss, same as the old boss.”1
*Associate Dean for Law Library Services & Information Technology and Professor of Law at Northern 
Kentucky University, Chase College of Law. The author would like to thank his research assistant Christine 
Mayhew, as well as Professor Michael Mannheimer and Professor Lawrence Rosenthal for their review and 
comments on the various drafts of this paper. 
1 THE WHO, Won’t Get Fooled Again, on WHO’S NEXT (1971). 
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ABSTRACT
 A close examination of the citation practices of the California and United States 
Supreme Courts from the twentieth and twenty-first centuries reveals that appellate 
jurisprudence in the Internet age closely resembles that of the pre-Internet age. These 
findings, coupled with the continued criticism of legal researchers in the Internet age, 
call for a retrenchment in training future lawyers in the essential skills of “thinking like a 
lawyer.”  The traditional techniques that have been taught by legal research and writing 
professors, and their doctrinal counterparts, must remain an essential part of our legal 
education system. Appellate jurisprudence in the Internet age is the same as it has always 
been. Whether one uses the Internet or a treatise to find legal information, the analytical 
skills necessary to determine relevant precedent remains the most important skill for a 
lawyer in the Internet age. 
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INTRODUCTION
¶1  Since the birth of legal information, lawyers and judges have been tasked with 
finding the relevant law, applying it to a set of facts, and arguing for an outcome that will 
solve the legal issue before them. This task has varied in complexity, and over time, the 
availability of legal information blossomed as the ease of printing legal information 
became more economical and wide-spread. As legal information began to proliferate, 
legal commentators lamented that the overwhelming availability of legal information was 
drowning the lawyers and judges who relied on this jurisprudence to make their legal 
arguments.
¶2  These criticisms continued into the twentieth century and morphed, as we entered 
the Internet age, into a lament of too much information coupled with the perceived 
unreliability of the new Internet sources. Some critics pointed to the vast amount of 
information available on the Internet as changing the landscape for lawyers and judges, 
including what information judges were relying on when making their rulings, and what 
information lawyers were turning to when making their arguments. 
¶3  While it is true that the Internet age has brought with it a second renaissance in the 
mass availability of legal information, it appears to be an overstatement to say that 
lawyers and judges are turning away from traditional sources of law to make their legal 
arguments and decisions. While change is certainly in the air in the world of appellate 
jurisprudence, a close examination of the sources lawyers and judges are using reveals 
that appellate jurisprudence has not changed as dramatically as some have feared it 
would. While the Internet presents some challenges to modern jurisprudence, it also 
reveals an opportunity for a broader availability of legal information to inform the 
arguments and decisions of the legal community. 
¶4  A close examination of the citation practices of the California and United States 
Supreme Courts from the twentieth and twenty-first centuries reveals that appellate 
jurisprudence in the Internet age closely resembles that of the pre-Internet age. These 
findings, coupled with the continued criticism of legal researchers in the Internet age, call 
for a retrenchment in training future lawyers in the essential skills of “thinking like a 
lawyer.”  The traditional techniques that have been taught by legal research and writing 
professors, and their doctrinal counterparts, must remain an essential part of our legal 
education system. Appellate jurisprudence in the Internet age is the same as it has always 
been. Whether one uses the Internet or a treatise to find legal information, the analytical 
skills necessary to determine relevant precedent remains the most important skill for a 
lawyer in the Internet age. 
I. CRITICISM OF THE GLUT OF LEGAL INFORMATION AND THE SKILLS OF LAWYERS AND 
JUDGES WHO USE THIS INFORMATION
¶5  Appellate jurisprudence has relied on the fact that there exists a stable universe 
from which judges and lawyers mine their information so that legal disputes can be 
resolved and stability can be maintained in the fabric of society. This stability has been 
undermined as the availability of legal information has grown. One possible outcome of 
too much legal information is that it shakes the stability relied upon by a fairly static 
jurisprudence, leaving lawyers to rely on unreliable legal materials and forcing judges to 
Vol. 14:3] Michael Whiteman
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pick from a cornucopia of legal arguments, undermining the stability of appellate 
jurisprudence.
¶6  To some, this argument will resonate as responding to the recent explosion of legal 
materials being made available thanks to the ease in which anyone can post information 
(legal, quasi-legal, or otherwise) on the Internet.  The truth is that commentators have 
been worried about the explosion of legal information and the effects this has had on 
legal research and jurisprudence for close to two centuries.
¶7  As early as 1821, Justice Story, in an address delivered before the members of the 
Suffolk Bar, proclaimed that “[i]n comparing the present state of jurisprudence with that 
of former times, we have much reason for congratulation.”2 As his address unfolds, 
however, Justice Story sees a move away from reliance on the “reports” as a place from 
which to draw jurisprudence. Rather, he says that “[o]ur young men of the present day 
are apt to confine their reading too much to elementary treatises.”3 Furthermore, as the 
post-Revolutionary War jurisprudence had increased and diversified the law within the 
Union, Story wondered if too much was being published, and as to the “reports,” whether 
“we shall be overwhelmed by their number and variety.”4 Finally, as Story’s address 
came to a close, he worried that: 
[t]he mass of the law is, to be sure, accumulating with an almost incredible 
rapidity, and with this accumulation, the labor of students, as well as 
professors, is seriously augmenting. It is impossible not to look without 
some discouragement upon the ponderous volumes, which the next half 
century will add to the groaning shelves of our jurists.5
¶8  While it is clear that the shelves of the jurists were not readily sagging under the 
weight of legal texts in Story’s time,6 this did not stop the belief that the growth of legal 
information would negatively impact the jurisprudence of the time. Story’s voice on this 
subject continued to carry this concern forward, and more than a century later, this same 
concern reared its head when commentators noted that “[t]here were simply too many 
cases, and each year added its frightening harvest to the appalling glut,”7 and that lawyers 
and judges need to be vigilant as “sources of the law grew more and more numerous.”8
¶9  While Story and later commentators lamented the “glut” of legal information, they 
could not have foreseen what was coming down the pipeline with the birth of the Internet. 
2 JOSEPH STORY, THE MISCELLANEOUS WRITINGS, LITERARY, CRITICAL, JURIDICAL, AND 
POLITICAL 405 (1835). 
3 Id. at 412. 
4 Id. at 417. 
5 Id. at 436. 
6 In fact, Story complained to the President of Harvard in 1829 that “[i]t is indispensable that the 
students have ready access to an ample law library which shall of itself afford a complete apparatus for 
study and consultation. . . . At present the students are compelled to resort to my own private library.” 
Arthur C. Pulling, The Harvard Law School Library, 43 LAW LIBR. J. 1, 2 (1950). Around the time of 
Story’s death (in 1845) the Harvard Law Library had only grown to around 6100 volumes. History of the 
Harvard Law School Library, HARVARD LAW SCH. LIBRARY,
http://www.law.harvard.edu/library/about/history/ [https://perma.cc/V7NV-GB63] (last visited Jan. 28, 
2015).
7 GRANT GILMORE, THE AGES OF AMERICAN LAW, 59, n.13 (1977). 
8 Morris L. Cohen, Research Habits of Lawyers, 9 JURIMETRICS J. 183, 185 (1969). 
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The Internet has made legal information available to all with a high–speed connection. 
Now, anyone can be a legal publisher through blogs, tweets, and more. This greatly 
expanded universe of information has created a quandary for lawyers and judges. How 
can they use this information in a manner that maintains a stable jurisprudence for the 
times? It has even been suggested that a lawyer who is not skilled in using online 
information will run afoul of the rules of professional responsibility.9
¶10  Several commentators have criticized electronic research and its effects on the 
research abilities of law students, lawyers, and judges.10 While there is probably some 
truth in these criticisms, they reflect a continuation of the time-honored tradition of 
criticizing the research skills of law students and newly minted attorneys.11 The one 
constant that remains is that regardless of the tools used to perform legal research, law 
students must gain a deep foundation of “thinking like a lawyer.” Thinking like a lawyer 
encompasses the analytical skills that form the basis for “good” lawyering which allow 
law students (and future lawyers) to uncover and utilize the basic building blocks of each 
jurisdiction’s jurisprudence.12
¶11  We know this to be true because a comparison of earlier citation practices of the 
appellate courts (as well as research habits of lawyers) with those of the modern-day 
judiciary and bar reveals that much of what is being done today mirrors the practices of 
the past. While the Internet age brings new challenges to the legal profession, it has not 
dramatically altered the foundations by which judges are creating modern-day 
jurisprudence.
II. PATTERNS OF APPELLATE COURT CITATION
¶12 The Internet has changed jurisprudence in many ways, including making a more 
diverse set of information available to lawyers and judges than ever before. While it is 
9 See Ellie Margolis, Surfin’ Safari – Why Competent Lawyers Should Research on the Web, 10
YALE J.L. & TECH 82 (2007); Michael Whiteman, The Impact of the Internet and Other Electronic Sources 
on an Attorney's Duty of Competence Under the Rules of Professional Conduct, 11 ALB. L.J. SCI. & TECH.
89 (2000). 
10 See Sarah Valentine, Legal Research as a Fundamental Skill: A Lifeboat for Students and Law 
Schools, U. BALT. L. REV. 173, 190–97 (2010); Yasmin Sokkar Harker, “Information is Cheap, But 
Meaning is Expensive”: Building Analytical Skill Into Legal Research Instruction, 105 LAW LIBR. J. 79
(2013). One author has gone as far as to ask if Google is making us stupid. See Nicholas Carr, Is Google 
Making Us Stupid? 302 ATLANTIC 56 (Jul/Aug 2008). 
11 See Paul D. Callister, Beyond Training: Law Librarianship’s Quest for the Pedagogy of Legal 
Research Education, 95 LAW LIBR. J. 7, 9–11 (2003). Professor Callister reviews a long list of criticisms of 
law student and lawyer research skills. For example Professor Callister cites to an article from 1902: “I 
have been amazed at the helplessness of law students, and even of lawyers when they go into a library to 
search for authorities . . . . Law schools should teach their students how to do these things.” Id. (citing
Horace E. Deemer, 1 AM. L. SCH. REV. 404, 404 (1902)). (Deemer was a justice of the Iowa Supreme 
Court.) From a 1981 article Professor Callister quotes: “There has been a great deal of dissatisfaction with 
[legal bibliography] courses among both students and faculty . . . . There is also some concern about 
whether these courses really convey the techniques of research.” Id. (citing Rhonda Carlson et al., 
Innovations in Legal Bibliography Instruction, 74 LAW LIBR. J. 615, 615 (1981)). 
12 There has been much written on “thinking like a lawyer” over the past many years. See, e.g.,
EDWIN SCOTT FRUEHWALD, THINK LIKE A LAWYER: LEGAL REASONING FOR LAW STUDENTS AND 
BUSINESS PROFESSIONALS (2013); FREDERICK F. SCHAUER, THINKING LIKE A LAWYER: A NEW
INTRODUCTION TO LEGAL REASONING (2009).
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true that a more diverse universe of information is now available, has this necessarily 
translated into a transformation of the authority that lawyers and judges rely on in 
formulating modern jurisprudence? The answer appears to be: “No.” A comparison of 
past and present citation practices of appellate courts reveals that judges (and lawyers 
through their briefs, arguments, and writings) are relying on the same types of materials 
as in the past, perhaps with a hint of turning to newer sources on occasion.13
¶13 Studies of the types of authority appellate courts rely on in making their decisions 
show that judges rely primarily on judicial decisions, most often from the highest 
appellate court in the jurisdiction. Furthermore, judges tend to rely on newer decisions, 
generally from the past ten years, with fewer citations to older decisions as time passes. It 
is telling that judges are relying mostly on case law and less on other sources of primary 
and secondary authorities. These patterns reveal that as lawyers are trained to rely on 
certain types of precedent, this training continues to influence them throughout their legal 
career. The Internet age has not dramatically altered the way courts create jurisprudence. 
¶14 The rationale behind a judge’s use of precedent remains largely unchanged from 
that of the past century. When a judge cites to a particular source in support of a position, 
this presumably means something to the judge, and “presumably he anticipates that it will 
mean something to a reader.”14 As judges formulate their opinions, one presumes that 
each citation is there to bolster the opinion, and to lend it some credibility as it stands as 
new authority in the jurisdiction. Thus, we can presume that citations are picked with care 
and not carelessly thrown about for no good reason. 
¶15 Authority is often used by judges for a number of good reasons, including:
(1) “The authority cited sets out the applicable law in the instant case, and the 
judge has no choice but to apply it. This is a strict doctrine of stare decisis rigidly 
applied. Under it the judge finds and applies the existing law …”15;
(2) “The authority cited sets out the applicable law which, as a matter of policy, 
the judge should apply unless other policy considerations require him to abandon 
precedent …”16;
(3) “The authority cited contains a rule which, of several possibly applicable 
rules, the judge prefers to apply to this case …”17; and 
(4) “The authority cited is in support of the position the judge wishes to take and 
therefor lends weight to it …”.18
¶16 Given these possibilities, the choice of authority used should signal to future 
researchers which sources to turn to when arguing before the court, as those sources of 
authority will be seen as the most persuasive. An examination of what courts have cited 
to in both the pre-Internet and Internet ages is therefore useful to help guide attorneys to 
the authority they should seek in order to formulate the most persuasive argument before 
the Court. If, as the findings below prove to be true, the greater availability of online 
13 See, e.g., Lee F. Peoples, The Citation of Wikipedia in Judicial Opinions, 12 YALE J. L. & TECH.
1 (2009); Coleen M. Barger, On the Internet, Nobody Knows You’re a Judge: Appellate Courts’ Use of 
Internet Materials, 4 J. APP. P. & PROC. 417, 438 (2002).
14 John Henry Merryman, The Authority of Authority: What the California Supreme Court Cited in 
1950, 6 STAN. L. REV. 613, 613 (1953–54). 
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sources is not altering the jurisprudence of the Internet age, then researchers should 
continue to seek and cite to those sources that judges continue to rely on as authority 
when crafting their decisions. 
A. Pre-Internet Age 
¶17 Traditionally, courts were fairly consistent in citing to only a handful of sources 
when deciding cases. This was due in part to the fact that there were very few sources 
available to them,19 and in part to the notions of stare decisis, which directed the 
development of the Common Law.  As time progressed, the number of sources began to 
proliferate at a rapid pace and by the twentieth century, lawyers and judges had a large 
number of sources from which to formulate arguments and draft judicial opinions.20
There is no need to guess which sources were of paramount importance to lawyers and 
judges: studies conducted at the time clearly revealed that judicial opinions from the 
highest appellate court of a jurisdiction were held in higher esteem than any other source. 
¶18 In the 1950s, John Henry Merryman undertook to determine what authority the 
California Supreme Court deemed the most relevant as it decided cases.21 An analysis of 
the judicial opinions of that high court revealed that of paramount importance were the 
decisions of the court itself, and specifically its opinions from the previous ten years. This 
same pattern is repeating itself today.  An analysis of the modern California Supreme 
Court and the United States Supreme Court show similar patterns of these courts relying 
on relatively current authority in their present-day decisions. 
 Professor Merryman’s study looked at 298 opinions of the California Supreme 
Court from the year 1950. He looked at what information was cited by the Court in each 
of those opinions. The most cited authority were recent California Supreme Court 
decisions. Of the 2,160 California Supreme Court decisions cited, 43% were decided by 
the Court in the previous ten years (1940–1950), 20% were decided between 1930 
and1939, and the rest were decided prior to that time.22 This same pattern is repeated with 
the 1,132 citations to the lower California appellate courts.23
¶19 Citations to authority outside of the California court system drop dramatically. The 
majority of the non-California court decisions come from citations to the federal courts 
and courts of the various states. There were 582 citations to federal court decisions and 
562 citations to decisions of other states’ courts.24 Beyond primary law, the California 
Supreme Court cited law reviews 87 times, the Restatements 32 times, legal 
encyclopedias 134 times, and miscellaneous other secondary sources 195 times.25 It is 
19 For example, in 1820 the Harvard Law Library had only 584 volumes in its collection. History 
of the Harvard Law School Library, HARV. L. SCH. LIBR.,
http://www.law.harvard.edu/library/about/history/ [https://perma.cc/82T7-2GMJ] (last visited Nov. 12, 
2015).
20 By 1932 Article 6 of the Association of American Law Schools called on member law schools 
to “own a law library of not less than ten thousand volumes.” ASS’N OF AM. L. SCHS., PROCEEDINGS OF THE 
ANNUAL MEETING 176 (1932). 
21 Merryman, supra note 14. 
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clear from these findings that the key piece of authority relied upon were recent decisions 
of the California Supreme Court, regardless of the fact that the California Supreme Court 
Justices had access to many other sources as they drafted their decisions. 
B. Internet Age 
¶20 “Case law is king” was the clear result of the previous citation studies in the pre-
Internet age. With the overwhelming glut of information now available at a touch of the 
key stroke, one may assume that this trend would give way in more recent judicial 
opinions. The analysis of current appellate court citation practices conducted for this 
article concludes that the use of precedent in the Internet age is similar to what existed in 
the pre-Internet age. While the resources available to lawyers and judges have expanded, 
the use of precedent remains the same. This should bring some measure of comfort to 
those who practice before the courts, because precedent remains the means by which we 
maintain uniformity and harmony to the law, to treat all of those who appear before the 
courts in the same manner.26
¶21 In the Internet age, one might argue that newer authority would more naturally be 
cited because researchers most commonly turn to computers to conduct their research.27
When one performs a search, the computer’s search algorithm is set up to bring recent 
cases to the top of the results list. One drawback to this set-up is that older authorities 
might be ignored in favor of the easier-to-find newer authorities that are at the top of the 
results list. Researchers might naturally gravitate to grab the first and easily available 
source that pops to the top of the list.28
¶22 While this might be a truism in today’s research world, especially given that recent 
studies of lawyer research habits reveal that lawyers are turning more and more to the 
Internet to begin their research,29 does this really point to a shift in how attorneys and 
judges are conducting research and relying on precedent? Recent studies suggest 
otherwise.
¶23 If we contrast the findings of the Merryman study30 with the findings of this 
article’s study of the modern citation practices of the U.S. Supreme Court and the 
26 As Llewellyn eloquently stated “As the social system varies we meet infinite variations as to 
what men or treatments or circumstances are to be classed as ‘like’; by the pressure to accept the views of 
the time and place remains.” Llewellyn, Case Law, 3 ENCYC. SOC. SCI. 249 (1930), quoted in Merryman, 
supra note 14, at 626. 
27 As early as 2006 the American Bar Association surveyed attorneys in an effort to determine the 
types of resources they used to conduct legal research. At that time 93% of the respondents conducted legal 
research online. Ellie Margolis, Surfin’ Safari – Why Competent Lawyers Should Research on the Web, 10
YALE J.L. & TECH 82, 108 (2007). The most recent ABA Legal Technology Survey Report (2014) confirms 
this trend with the overwhelming majority of respondents reporting that they turn first to online sources to 
begin their research. Joshua Poje, Legal Research, ABA TechReport (2014), 
http://www.americanbar.org/publications/techreport/2014/legal-research.html [https://perma.cc/EN95-
QZMY].
28 One expert in the field of library science would describe this as the “Principle of Least Effort” 
that has become prevalent in the Internet age. THOMAS MANN, LIBRARY RESEARCH MODELS 91 (1993). 
29 A survey of 190 young attorneys from small to large law firms found that on average these 
lawyers spent eighty-four percent of their research time using for-pay or free online resources. Steven A. 
Lastres, Rebooting Legal Research in a Digital Age LLRX (Aug. 10, 2013), 
http://www.llrx.com/features/legalinstruction.htm [https://perma.cc/857Z-LHJ5]. 
30 Merryman, supra note 14, at 653. 
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California Supreme Court, we see that today’s appellate courts rely on very much the 
same types of precedent as the courts did in the past. The Merryman study revealed that 
the California Supreme Court relied most heavily on recent (previous ten years) appellate 
decisions from the California Supreme Court to come to its decisions.31 In the Internet 
age, with online information available at a researcher’s fingertips, the same pattern 
appears to continue to guide the citation practices of appellate courts. 
1. California Supreme Court Citation Practices 
¶24 This article examined opinions of the California Supreme Court for 201432 in order 
to update Prof. Merryman’s study.33 Fifty years later, the California Supreme Court, even 
with all of its access to multi-jurisdictional primary and secondary sources at its 
electronic fingertips, maintained its pattern of citing mainly to recent appellate court 
opinions from the California high court.  Within the 221 cases decided by the California 
Supreme Court in 2014, the most cited authority were past California Supreme Court 
decisions. Of the 2,660 California Supreme Court decisions cited, 51% were decided by 
the California Supreme Court in the previous ten years (2004–2014), and 49% were 
decided from 2003 and prior. 
¶25 Surprisingly, this pattern did not repeat itself with citations to decisions of the 
lower California courts. Of the 447 lower California court opinions cited, only 39% were 
decided between 2004 and 2014. The rest of the decisions were decided in 2003 or 
earlier. It is interesting to note that unlike Merryman’s study, where the California 
Supreme Court cited to approximately 50% fewer lower court cases than Supreme Court 
cases, in 2014, the California Supreme Court’s citations to California lower court cases 
were only 17% of the number of citations to California Supreme Court cases. This lower 
citation pattern stands in stark contrast to the fact that the entire body of California case 
law would be readily available to the Justices on their computers. 
¶26 The California Supreme Court continued to cite to authority from outside of the 
California court system, much as it did during the period of Merryman’s earlier study. 
But unlike the results in Merryman’s study, citations to authority outside of the California 
court system dropped off dramatically. There were only 556 citations to decisions of the 
U.S. Supreme Court, 134 decisions to the U.S. Courts of Appeals, twenty-six decisions to 
the lower federal courts, and only 177 citations to the decisions of other State courts. 
31 Id.
32 See Appendix B for a chart of the California Supreme Court 2014 citation practices. 
33 This study was developed through a search of the Westlaw database of all California Supreme 
Court decisions, limited to those decided between January 1,2014 and December 31, 2014. The search 
returned 221 results, which were then sorted by date. Each of the 221 cases were read and the number of 
citations tallied. For each opinion, every citation the court referenced was placed in a source category. 
Citations were counted only once per opinion, for example if the Court referenced one case at five different 
points in the opinion it was only included once in the total count for that category. However, if the same 
case was cited in five different opinions it was counted five times in the total count for that category. 
Citation to the case below was not included in the count. This study did not include citation to statutes or 
regulations for two reasons: (1) Merryman did not include them in his earlier study, and (2) statutes and 
regulations, when cited, tend to be controlling. Jurisprudence is actually built around the interpretation of 
these controlling authorities. Thus we turn to judicial decisions, and secondary sources to help interpret 
what these authorities mean. 
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¶27 This drop-off in citations to authority outside of the California court system 
continued with citation to secondary sources. The Court cited law reviews only forty-nine 
times (almost half the number cited in the Merryman study), other secondary legal 
sources eighteen times, non-legal sources six times, and Internet sources only sixteen 
times.
¶28 These findings reinforce that jurisprudence remains wedded in the recent decisions 
of the appellate courts from within one’s own jurisdiction. As in Merryman’s study, 
recent decisions of the California Supreme Court were the key source of authority. This 
remained true regardless of the fact that the 2014 California Supreme Court had access to 
far more legal and non-legal information than its counterpart did in the 1950s. 
¶29 Perhaps this was a California anomaly? In order to provide further support for these 
results, an analysis of the citation patterns of the modern United States Supreme Court 
was undertaken to check against the California results. Like we were able to do with the 
California Supreme Court, we are able to look at past citation practices of the United 
States Supreme Court and compare them with present practices. 
2. United States Supreme Court Citation Practices 
¶30 A study, which focused on the decisions of the United States Supreme Court from 
1946 to 2005,34 reveals that the Court in both the pre-Internet era and the Internet era 
maintained its practice of citing to recent decisions of the Court. According to the study, 
“[t]he effect of going from being recently decided to just 10 years of age reduces a 
precedent’s value by 65 percent and 72 percent at the Supreme Court and courts of 
appeals, respectively.”35 These results are consistent with earlier studies that came to this 
same conclusion;36 the difference being that this study included decisions penned during 
the Internet age. 
¶31 Almost ten years after this study, and well into the Internet age, the citation 
practices of the Supreme Court remain consistent. A study conducted for this article of 
the decisions of the United States Supreme Court’s 2012 Term37 reveals a heavy reliance 
on more recent authority by the Court.38 Similar to Merryman’s study, the findings of the 
2012 Term reveal that the Court cited to 1445 of its own decisions. Of these, 672, or 46.5 
percent, were from the last twenty years. This number is in line with those of the 
Merryman and Black-Spriggs studies. 
34 Ryan C. Black and James F. Spriggs II, The Citation and Depreciation of U.S. Supreme Court 
Precedent, 10 J. EMPIRICAL LEGAL STUD. 325 (2013). 
35 Id. at 327. 
36 See, e.g., Lawrence M. Friedman et. al., State Supreme Courts: A Century of Style and Citation,
33 STAN. L. REV. 773 (1981); William M. Landes & Richard A. Posner, Legal Precedent: A Theoretical 
and Empirical Analysis, 19 J.L. & ECON. 249 (1976). 
37 See Appendix A for a chart of the 2012 Term citation practices. 
38 This study was developed by reviewing the seventy-nine opinions from the U.S. Supreme 
Court’s 2012 term. Each of the seventy-nine cases were read and the number of citations tallied. For each 
opinion, every citation the Court referenced was placed in a source category. Citations were counted only 
once per opinion, for example if the Court referenced one case at five different points in the opinion it was 
only included once in the total count for that category. However, if the same case was cited in five different 
opinions, it was counted five times in the total count for that category. Citation to the case below was not 
included in the count. 
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¶32 The Court’s citation to the decisions of the Circuit Courts of Appeals reveals an 
even wider divide between more recent and past decisions. The Court cited to the U.S. 
Courts of Appeals 349 times. Of these, 274  (78.5%) were from the last twenty years. 
This pattern is also present in the other authority cited during the term. For example, the 
Court cited to 182 state court decisions. Of these, 122 (67%) were from the last twenty 
years.
¶33 In keeping with the pattern that emerges from all of these studies, citations to non-
judicial opinions remain relatively few. The Court cited to only seventy-four law review 
articles,39 and to only thirty-seven Internet sources. The Court also cited to a 
miscellaneous number of non-legal sources a total of 167 times. Once again, this low 
citation rate runs counter to the fact that the Court had unprecedented access to legal and 
non-legal information. Judicial decisions remained the “king of precedent” and the 
bedrock of the Internet age’s jurisprudence. 
 The idea that researchers, regardless of whether they have quick, easy access to 
online information, will rely on newer precedents appears to have less to do with the 
research habits of the lawyers and judges and more to do with societal influences. “[T]he 
informational value of court opinions depreciates as they age. As society evolves and law 
changes due to economic, social, and political developments, the extent to which a 
precedent remains pertinent for deciding legal disputes diminishes.”40
¶34 William Landes and Richard Posner first posited this position in 1976, when they 
wrote that a precedent “depreciates in an economic sense because the value of its 
information content declines over time with changing circumstances.”41 Thus, it makes 
sense that as society changes and progresses, more recent precedent, no matter how 
discovered, will be more meaningful as judges craft tomorrow’s jurisprudence.42 Put 
another way, earlier precedent will tend to lose its value over time due to being 
“superseded by other rulings or because the area of law it governs becomes so settled that 
the Court no longer hears cases that fall under the scope of the precedent.”43
 Furthermore, it is common practice for appellate courts to look to the briefs 
submitted by the attorneys for an initial determination of the legal questions posed, and 
the precedents that support the positions put forth. In three studies44 of the effect of briefs 
on the appellate courts, the authors’ findings are consistent with the major themes 
revealed by the Merryman study and the subsequent studies conducted for this article. 
39 See Appendix C.
40 Black & Spriggs, supra note 34, at 325. 
41 Landes & Posner, supra note 36, at 263. 
42 Landes and Posner offer the following illustration of how this works: “To illustrate, a decision 
involving a collision between two horse drawn wagons is bound to lose some of its precedential value when 
wagons are replaced by cars and trucks, and a decision turning on the difference between ‘trespass’ and 
‘trespass on the case’ may lose all of its precedential value when the common-law forms of action are 
abolished by statute.” Id.
43 James H. Fowler and Sangick Jeon, The Authority of Supreme Court Precedent, 30 SOC.
NETWORKS 16, 30 (2008). 
44 See generally Susan B. Haire and Laura P. Moyer, Advocacy Through Briefs in the U.S. Courts 
of Appeals, 32 S. ILL. U. L.J. 593 (2008); Laura P. Moyer, Todd A. Collins, & Susan B. Haire, The Value of 
Precedent: Appellate Briefs and Judicial Opinions in the U.S. Courts of Appeals, 34 JUST. SYS. J. 62
(2013); Adam Feldman, Who Wins in the Supreme Court? An Examination of Attorney and Law Firm 
Influence (Aug. 13, 2015), http://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract_id=2643826 
[https://perma.cc/83SZ-DTYE]. 
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One of the main results of these studies was that more experienced counsel tended to 
submit briefs that ended up on the winning side more often than not. One hypotheses put 
forth by these studies was that “more experienced, expert counsel . . . would be expected 
to identify precedents that have greater informational value to the court …”45 Decisions 
of the circuit courts and the Supreme Court were more likely to be cited. “By grounding 
an opinion in the law of the circuit or the decisions of the U.S. Supreme Court, a judge 
will enhance the legitimacy of that decision.”46 In keeping with the overall premise of 
this article, the studies also found that newer cases were cited more heavily, as “[o]lder 
cases may also lack the salience and influence of more recent precedents.”47
¶35 The lessons law students, attorneys, and judges can draw from these studies point 
to the fact that the Internet age has not caused a change in the underlying precedents upon 
which judges rely to create our jurisprudence. As such, researchers should continue to 
learn how to identify the most relevant judicial decisions from one’s jurisdiction and use 
those as the major underpinning for one’s argument before any court. 
C. Similarities
¶36 The Internet age has expanded the universe of sources that are available to 
attorneys and judges as they research legal problems. Much like the citation practices 
revealed above, the manner in which courts and the legal profession view secondary 
sources remains consistent in the Internet age, as it had in the pre-Internet age. 
¶37 In the pre-Internet age, law students were taught that they should rely on primary 
sources to build their legal arguments. Secondary sources were to be used as a way to 
find the most relevant primary sources.48 The Merryman study pointed out that appellate 
courts did not rely heavily on secondary sources when citing authority.49 Part of the 
reason for that can be found in the literature of the time, where caution was urged in 
using secondary sources. Many of the very same questions asked of those sources are 
asked about today’s Internet-age sources. Reliability, quality, and currency of the 
information are all questions that a good legal researcher must ask of a source found 
online, and the difficulty in answering those questions explains why courts are reluctant 
to cite to online sources.50 These same cautions are echoes of the pre-Internet age. When 
describing the California Supreme Court’s citation to secondary authority, Merryman 
explains that “it should be equally apparent that whether the . . . citation of secondary 
authority will be good or bad depends to a great extent on the quality of the work, the 
assumption on which it is based, the method it adopts, the purpose for which it has been 
prepared and the like.”51
¶38 Given the greater availability and amount of access to secondary sources, why, in 
the Internet age, haven’t courts turned more to secondary sources? For example, the 
online offerings of Westlaw and LEXIS have expanded greatly over time. In 1992, the 
45 Moyer, Collins, & Haire, supra note 44, at 66. 
46 Id. at 67. 
47 Id.
48 Miles O. Price & Harry Bitner, EFFECTIVE LEGAL RESEARCH 216 (3d ed. Little Brown & Co. 
1969).
49 Merryman, supra note 14, at 669–72. 
50 See St. Clair v. Johnny’s Oyster & Shrimp, Inc., 76 F. Supp. 2d 773, 775 (S.D. Tex. 1999).
51 Merryman, supra note 14, at 627. 
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Westlaw Database Directory had 140 pages. In 2000, the Directory had grown to 700 
pages, and by 2007, it had grown to 1,150 pages.52 The LexisNexis service saw similar 
growth in its online offerings. In 1994, the LexisNexis Database Directory alphabetical 
listing ran 124 pages;53 in 1999, that had grown to 231 pages,54 and by 2007, it had grown 
to 401 pages.55 In 1994, LEXIS had approximately seventy legal periodicals in the 
database56 and grew to over 650 by 2004.57 Similarly, secondary sources across the board 
continued to increase on LEXIS. For example, in 1994, the Ohio library had only four 
secondary sources;58 by 2004, there were seventy-four secondary sources available in the 
Ohio library.59 This growth in resources was consistent across the LexisNexis database. 
For example, in 2004, LexisNexis added 1,300 new resources,60 and in 2007, 1,150 
additional resources were added.61
¶39 Since 2007, many new players have entered the online legal database marketplace. 
BloombergLaw has made more legal news, company news, and a broad array of 
secondary legal sources available at the touch of a key stroke. The same is true for other 
legal databases such as HeinOnline, Casemaker, and Fastcase, to name but a few of the 
ever-growing list of players. 
¶40 Given the availability of this information, why are these sources not cited more 
often? The answer remains that jurisprudence continues to rely on recent appellate court 
decisions. Secondary sources remain a source best used for finding primary authority, a 
concept understood by most competent legal research professionals. 
¶41 An additional reason exists that explains the low rate of citation to secondary 
sources. This reasoning appears to resonate across the ages. In the pre- and current 
Internet age, there exists valid (and some dubious) criticisms of secondary sources. These 
criticisms play a part in the appellate courts’ reluctance in relying too heavily on 
secondary sources. A review of various secondary sources will help illustrate the various 
rationales for this reluctance. 
1. Legal Periodicals 
¶42 Among the secondary sources, legal periodicals are relied upon more heavily than 
most any other secondary source. In Merryman’s study, the California Supreme Court 
cited legal periodicals eighty-seven times.62 In 2014, the California Supreme Court cited 
them forty-nine times and the United States Supreme Court cited them seventy-four times 
in its 2012 Term. Compared to other sources, the law review is at the top of secondary 
52 E-mail from Diana Yund, Law School Product Specialist at Thomson Reuters, to author (Apr. 
24, 2013). 
53 Lexis-Nexis Library Content Alphabetical List Quick Reference (1994). Special thanks to 
Patricia J. Carter, Manager of the LexisNexis Technical Library for gathering up older versions of the 
Lexis-Nexis Directories for use in this article. 
54 Lexis-Nexis Directory of Online Services (1999). 
55 Lexis-Nexis Directory of Online Services (2007). 
56 Lexis-Nexis Library Content, supra note 53. 
57 Lexis-Nexis Directory of Online Services (2004). 
58 Lexis-Nexis Library Content, supra note 53. 
59 Lexis-Nexis Directory, supra note 57. 
60 Id.
61 Lexis-Nexis Directory, supra note 55. 
62 Merryman, supra note 14, at 653.
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sources, but it pales in comparison to the citation of primary law. The rationale for the 
relatively high citation rate of legal periodicals, as compared with other secondary 
sources, is not hard to fathom. Many judges who sit on the high court, and the attorneys 
who appear before them, may very well have been on law review while in law school and 
thus have a healthy respect for the publication.63 They understand the value of the 
opinions expressed in legal periodicals and thus might rely on them to highlight a point of 
law that might not be well represented in current case law. 
¶43 While legal periodicals receive a healthy number of citations, they have not 
escaped criticism, and their citation rates have steadily declined throughout the years.64
This is somewhat counter-intuitive given the fact that in the Internet age, legal periodicals 
are far more accessible than at any time in the past.65
¶44  While law reviews are being cited in judicial opinions, their jurisprudential value 
has been criticized. This criticism is not new to the Internet age; it even predates 
Merryman’s article. In 1936, Professor Fred Rodell (of Yale Law), quipped in the 
Virginia Law Review that he no longer wished to contribute to “the qualitatively 
moribund while quantitatively mushroom-like literature of the law.”66 Rodell complained 
that the law reviews provided “a pennyworth of content . . . beneath a pound of so-called 
style.”67 This complaint is echoed by present-day commentators with respect to the 
usefulness of law reviews to those outside the academy. 
¶45  Judge Richard A. Posner has criticized modern law reviews in much the same way 
that Rodell did in the pre-Internet age: 
[T]oo many articles are too long, too dull, and too heavily annotated, and 
that many interdisciplinary articles are published that have no merit at all. 
Worse is the effect of these characteristics of law reviews in marginalizing 
the kind of legal scholarship that student editors can handle well—articles 
that criticize judicial decisions or, more constructively, discern new 
directions in law by careful analysis of decisions. Such  articles are of 
great value to the profession, including its judicial branch, but they are 
becoming rare . . . .68
¶46  Judge Posner is not alone in his attack on academic law reviews.69 Chief Justice 
Roberts slighted law reviews while answering questions at a conference of federal judges 
63 For example, in 2015, four of the seven Justices of the California Supreme Court were on law 
review in law school. 
64 For a list of articles that have studied this steady decline, see David L. Schwartz & Lee 
Petherbridge, The Use of Legal Scholarship by the Federal Courts of Appeals: An Empirical Study, 96
CORNELL L. REV. 1345, 1349 n.13 (2011). 
65 Access to nearly every academic law review is available on WestlawNext, Lexis Advance, and 
HeinOnline. For HeinOnline, these periodicals include coverage back to the inception of the law review. 
For example, the Harvard Law Review can be accessed from vol. 1 (1887) to the present. 
66 Fred Rodell, Goodbye to Law Reviews, 23 VA. L. REV. 38 (1936). 
67 Id.
68 Richard A. Posner, Against the Law Reviews, LEGAL AFFAIRS (Nov./Dec. 2004), 
http://www.legalaffairs.org/issues/November-December-2004/review_posner_novdec04.msp 
[https://perma.cc/UL7M-BC5V]. 
69 Many of Posner’s fellow jurists have heaped scorn upon law reviews. For example, Chief Judge 
Dennis Jacobs (2d Circuit Court of Appeals) quipped that he hasn’t “opened up a law review in years … 
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of the Fourth Circuit. Chief Justice Roberts quipped that law reviews were of little value 
to the bench and bar. He answered a question by saying: 
Pick up a copy of any law review that you see . . . and the first article is 
likely to be, you know, the influence of Immanuel Kant on evidentiary 
approaches in 18th-century Bulgaria, or something, which I’m sure was of 
great interest to the academic that wrote it, but isn’t of much help to the 
bar.70
¶47  These criticisms from the bench and bar might well have something to do with the 
declining citation to law reviews within appellate court decisions. In a study of United 
States Supreme Court decisions from 1971 to 1999 a sharp drop in the number of 
citations to law reviews was found.71 Citations to law reviews dropped consistently 
during this period: 
 
1971–73 963 citations to law reviews; 
 1981–83 767 citations to law reviews; 
 1991–93 577 citations to law reviews; 
1996–98 271 citations to law reviews.72
¶48  In this article’s study of the 2012 United States Supreme Court, citation to law 
reviews declined even further with only seventy-four citations. 
 In keeping with the findings of this article and those of Merryman’s study, the 
Court tended to favor more recent law review articles over those from the past. For the 
1996–98 period, 47.6 percent of all articles cited were published since 1990, and 21.77 
percent were published since 1995.73
¶49  Along with the decline in the citation to law reviews overall, there was also a 
decline in the citation to the top ranked journals. This continued a similar decline 
observed in the previous studies. For example, between 1971 and 1999 citation to 
journals from the top twenty schools, with two exceptions, declined over the period.74 In 
the 2012 study of the Court only forty-six percent of the citations were to top twenty 
[n]o one speaks of them. No one relies on them.” Adam Liptak, When Rendering Decisions, Judges Are 
Finding Law Reviews Irrelevant, N.Y. TIMES A8 (Mar. 19, 2007), 
http://www.nytimes.com/2007/03/19/us/19bar.html?_r=0 [https://perma.cc/T98D-AVAT]. 
70 Kenneth Jost, Roberts’ Ill-Informed Attack on Legal Scholarship, JUSTICE BLOG (July 19, 2011), 
http://jostonjustice.blogspot.com/2011/07/roberts-ill-informed-attack-on-legal.html 
[https://perma.cc/WVG6-TNC5]. For a more in-depth discussion of this issue, see Harry T. Edwards, 
Another Look at Professor Rodell’s Goodbye to Law Reviews, 100 VA. L. REV. 1483 (2014). In a light 
hearted response to the Chief Justice’s comments, Prof. Orin S. Kerr wrote an article on this very topic. See
Orin S. Kerr, The Influence of Immanuel Kant on Evidentiary Approaches in 18th-Century Bulgaria, 18 
GREEN BAG 2D 251 (2015). For those who cannot wait to read the article to know the conclusion, Professor 
Kerr concludes that Kant had no influence on this topic of Bulgarian law. 
71 Louis J. Sirico Jr., The Citing of Law Reviews by the Supreme Court: 1971-1999, 75 IND. L.J. 
1009 (2000). 
72 Id. at 1011. 
73 Id. at 1015. 
74 Id. at 1029. 
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journals, while thirty-two percent were to journals from below the top 100.75 Compare 
this with the citation practices of the Court from 1996–98 when sixty-three percent of 
citations were to top twenty journals.76 This number is down from the 1991–93 period 
when eighty-six percent of citations were to top twenty journals.77
¶50  One might conclude from the courts’ citations to law reviews that the Internet age 
has brought some diversity to appellate citation practices. The greater access to law 
reviews afforded to lawyers and judges has allowed for law journal articles from below 
the top twenty to find their way into the jurisprudence of the age. However, this 
development appears counter-balanced by the continued decline in the use of the law 
review by the courts overall. 
¶51  Thus, appellate jurisprudence in the Internet age mirrors that of the pre-Internet 
age. Even the law review, the strongest of the secondary sources, is disfavored over 
recent appellate court opinions, and even when cited, the court favors citing to more 
recent scholarship than to scholarship of the past.78 Furthermore, the bench and the bar 
are consistent in their criticism of law reviews and their usefulness as a whole outside the 
legal academy. As Rodell, our pre-Internet commentator, observed, “The only consumers 
of law reviews outside the academic circle are the law offices, which never actually read 
them but stick them away on a shelf for future reference.”79 It should be noted that this 
criticism might overstate the reality of practice. The fact that lawyers are not citing to law 
reviews does not necessarily mean that they do not use them to guide their research and 
formulate their arguments. 
2. Other Secondary Sources 
¶52  While legal periodicals are the most heavily cited, law-related secondary sources, 
there are a number of other sources that legal researchers turn to when conducting their 
research. In the pre-Internet age, lawyers and judges turned to treatises, legal 
encyclopedias, the Restatements, and other sources to investigate the law and guide them 
to relevant primary authority.  At times, these secondary sources would be cited by the 
courts but then, as now, they were largely left out of appellate jurisprudence. The 
rationale for this, like with legal periodicals, remains two-fold: (1) recent appellate court 
opinions reside as the primary source of appellate jurisprudence; and (2) lawyers and 
judges are skeptical about the overall quality and reliability of secondary sources. 
¶53  The complaint commonly heard about the Internet is that we do not know who is 
responsible for placing the information online, and we cannot rely on its accuracy. This 
criticism is often targeted at online encyclopedias such as Wikipedia.80  This same 
75 See Appendix C. 
76 Sirico, supra note 71, at 1023. 
77 Id.
78 Justice Scalia “commented that the shelf life of a law review article is about five years.” David 
L. Schwartz and Lee Petherbridge, The Use of Legal Scholarship by the Federal Courts of Appeals: An 
Empirical Study, 96 CORNELL L. REV. 1345, 1371 (2011). 
79 Rodell, supra note 66, at 45. 
80 For example, the 8th Circuit took an administrative law judge to task for relying in part on 
Wikipedia for its decision. In Badasa v. Mukasey, 540 F.3d 909 (8th Cir. 2008), the court was troubled by 
the use of Wikipedia. The court reviewed Wikipedia’s notoriously open system for adding and editing 
entries and was clearly uncomfortable with Wikipedia as a source of evidence in legal proceedings. The 
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criticism was targeted at the legal encyclopedias during the pre-Internet age. When 
describing the Cyclopedia of Law and Procedure,81 Merryman commented that this 
resource lists who the editors and contributors are but does not reveal their qualifications 
to actually be authoring this encyclopedia. Merryman wrote that “[n]owhere does there 
appear information which might make it possible to assess their ability to provide lawyers 
with a complete working knowledge of the law which will make it unnecessary for them 
to consult the reported cases.”82 Legal Encyclopedias have not escaped criticism in the 
modern era. One professor of legal research stated succinctly that “[o]nly a fool cites to 
legal encyclopedias as persuasive authority.”83
¶54  Other secondary sources did not escape criticism in the earlier parts of the 
twentieth-century. One commentator criticized secondary sources such as the 
Restatements for being too focused on black-letter law and not on the process and 
thoughts that go into deciding tort cases.84
 In describing the Restatements, one author aptly said of them: “[t]hose of us who 
have had occasion to make use of the Restatement somewhat extensively realize that the 
complete product finds its greatest usefulness as a jumping-off point for the beginning of 
discussion.”85
¶55  Clark’s arguments for relying on primary authority is as relevant in today’s Internet 
age as it was almost seventy years ago. In discussing the Restatements, Clark’s argument 
can easily be transferred to encompass all secondary sources, whether they be found 
online or in print: 
The Restatements are easy and graceful citations upon settled points; but 
rarely, if ever, do they point the way out of a dispute or through a morass. 
American lawyers and judges like to be shown and convinced; and since 
the supporting grounds are carefully eliminated from the Restatements, 
they do not contain the material to persuade. One must resort to the 
court spent close to a third of a very short opinion detailing the unreliable nature of Wikipedia. Legal 
commentators have wondered about the use of these sources by lawyers and judges. “Since when did a 
Web site that any Internet surfer can edit become an authoritative source by which law students could write 
passing papers, experts could provide credible testimony, lawyers could craft legal arguments, and judges 
could issue precedents?” R. Jason Richards, Courting Wikipedia, TRIAL 62 (Apr. 2008). For a full 
discussion of the use of Wikipedia and the criticisms surrounding it please see: Jodi L. Wilson, Proceed
with Extreme Caution: Citation to Wikipedia in Light of Contributor Demographics and Content Policies,
16 VAND. J. ENT. & TECH. L. 857 (2014); Joseph L. Gerken, How Courts Use Wikipedia, 11 J. APP. PRAC.
& PROCESS 191 (2010); Lee F. Peoples, The Citation of Wikipedia in Judicial Opinions, 12 YALE J. L. &
TECH. 1 (2010). 
81 Published by American Law Book Co. in 1901. See Merryman, supra note 14, at 634. 
82 Merryman, supra note 14, at 635. 
83 ROBERT C. BERRING & ELIZABETH A. EDINGER, FINDING THE LAW 301 (11th ed. 1999). While 
Professors Berring and Edinger’s caution has much merit, there will be times when a legal encyclopedia 
may still be an excellent resource for making quick points of settled law. See, e.g., Clapper v. Amnesty Int’l 
USA, 133 S.Ct. 1138, 1163 (2013) (Breyer, J. dissenting) (citing 42 AM. JUR. 2d Injunctions § § 2, 5 (2010) 
for the proposition that “an injunction is ordinarily preventive in character and restrains actions that have 
not yet been taken, but threaten injury.”); People v. Gonzales, 54 Cal. 4th 1234, 1259 (Cal. 2012) (citing 
two legal encyclopedias for settled legal principles). 
84 See, e.g., Leon Green, The Torts Restatement, 29 ILL. L. REV. 582 (1935). 
85 CHARLES E. CLARK, REAL COVENANTS AND OTHER INTERESTS WHICH RUN WITH LAND 246 (2d 
ed. 1947). 
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detailed writings of scholars, and, of course, especially of the various 
Reporters where they are available,  for the arguments and supporting 
data which will point to eventual decision.86
¶56  Secondary authority is not cited heavily for a number of reasons, but there is little 
question that then, like now, secondary authority has its benefits. The Google generation 
is fond of starting most of its research with a Google search.87 This is the modern 
equivalent of using a secondary source to guide one’s research toward the best primary 
authority on point. While secondary sources might not be the bedrock of appellate 
jurisprudence, it has its uses. It is important for lawyers and judges to understand the 
advantages and disadvantages of the Internet in today’s legal research environment. 
¶57  While the tools used by lawyers and judges to conduct research have changed over 
the last fifty years, the evidence shows that the authority relied on by judges remains 
closely harmonious. Recent case law from a jurisdiction’s highest appellate court remains 
the single most important piece of authority and forms the backbone of a jurisdiction’s 
jurisprudence. Whether located in a printed reporter or on a court’s web site, the judicial 
decision remains the “king of authority.” 
III. THE INTERNET’S IMPACT ON THE COURTS
¶58  The preceding studies have highlighted the ways in which appellate jurisprudence 
has remained stable despite the vast changes the Internet has brought to the legal 
landscape. It would be disingenuous to suggest that the Internet has had no impact on the 
way law is practiced. It is therefore worthwhile, looking at some of the areas where 
lawyers and judges should exercise caution and develop strategies, to deal with the 
changes the Internet has brought to the practice of law. 
¶59  The studies conducted for this article point quite conclusively to the fact that the 
primary sources of authority an attorney should be looking for to persuade a court are the 
recent decisions from one’s home appellate court. At the same time, study after study 
point to the fact that more and more attorneys are looking to the Internet in order to 
uncover this information. Thus, attorneys should be cognizant of the fact that when 
looking at the Internet for legal information, they should keep in mind two questions: (1) 
Is the information online authentic? and (2) Is the information reliable? 
¶60  Authentication of online legal information has spawned interest within the legal 
information professionals’ community in the form of an effort to compile a list of 
authenticated primary law.88 These concerns have led the Uniform Law Commission to 
86 Id. at 246–47. 
87 It is likely this trend will continue since, as one commentator noted, it is hard to convince people 
to learn how to use a variety of research sources, as most people “are less receptive to training in general 
because they think that they can find everything by using Google-type searches, whether in Google or non-
Google sources.” Heidi W. Heller, The Twenty-First Century Law Library: A Law Firm Librarian’s
Thoughts, 101 L. LIBR. J. 517, 522 (2009). 
88 See AALL Access to Elec. Legal Info. Comm. & AALL Gov’t Relations Office, State-by-State
Report on Authentication of Online Legal Resources,
http://www.aallnet.org/mm/Publications/products/Report-on-Authentication-of-Online-Legal-
Resources.html [https://perma.cc/E4EW-8PDU]. 
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propose the adoption of the Uniform Electronic Legal Materials Act (UELMA or “The 
Act”).89 UELMA is designed to establish: 
[A]n outcomes-based, technology-neutral framework for providing online 
legal material with the same level of trustworthiness traditionally provided 
by publication in a law book. The Act requires that official electronic legal 
material be: (1) authenticated, by providing a method to determine that it 
is unaltered; (2) preserved, either in electronic or print form; and (3) 
accessible, for use by the public on a permanent basis.90
         As of 2015, it has been enacted by twelve States, with four other states considering 
it in their 2015 legislative sessions.91
¶61  UELMA, if adoptions continue, will help erase the authentication issue (at least 
with primary sources) from the legal researcher’s mind: 
When a document is authentic, it means that the version of the legal 
resource presented to the user is the same as that published by the official 
publisher. Authentication provides an electronic method to establish the 
integrity of the document, demonstrating that the information has not been 
tampered with or altered during the transfer between the official publisher 
and the end-user.92
¶62  Once the majority (or all) jurisdictions adopt this type of model, legal researchers 
will not need to concern themselves with whether the online version of the case they are 
reading is authentic. 
¶63  A second issue that arises when using information located on the Internet is the 
trustworthiness of online primary information.93 This debate predates the Internet, as 
lawyers have historically been cautioned to verify that the information they rely on is 
trustworthy.94 In the Internet age, this comes to the forefront as anyone can post 
information to the Internet. Thus, legal researchers are cautioned to look critically at 
anything found on the Internet. 
89 Uniform Law Commission, Uniform Electronic Legal Materials Act, 
http://www.uniformlaws.org/shared/docs/electronic%20legal%20material/uelma_final_2011.pdf 
[https://perma.cc/DS5N-9RWK]. 
90 Uniform Law Commission, Uniform Electronic Legal Materials Act Webpage, 
http://www.uniformlaws.org/Act.aspx?title=Electronic+Legal+Material+Act [https://perma.cc/8FP6-
C3TD]. 
91 Uniform Law Commission, Legislative Fact Sheet - Electronic Legal Material Act, 
http://www.uniformlaws.org/LegislativeFactSheet.aspx?title=Electronic%20Legal%20Material%20Act 
[https://perma.cc/4BQ6-JVHJ]. 
92 Uniform Law Commission, Uniform Electronic Legal Material Act: UELMA Prefatory Note at 
1, http://www.uniformlaws.org/shared/docs/electronic%20legal%20material/uelma_final_2011.pdf 
[https://perma.cc/DS5N-9RWK]. 
93 David G. Badertscher & Deborah E. Melnick, Is Primary Legal Information on the Web 
Trustworthy?, 49 Judges J. 13, 14 (2010). 
94 Merryman, supra note 14, at 635. 
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¶64  While caution should be taken to insure that primary sources found on the Internet 
are authentic and that all resources found on the Internet are reliable, there are advantages 
to having all of this information available for lawyers and judges: 
For at least the past 100 years courts have been relying increasingly on 
social, political, historical, and recently scientific data to bolster primary 
sources within their opinions. Over the past 10 years that trend has 
become significantly more pronounced due to the rapidly increasing 
accessibility of legal information on the Web.95
¶65  The Internet has made access to a vast array of information far more available than 
ever before. Now, legal researchers will have access to gray literature, that is “all the 
working papers, blogs, conference papers, news headlines, and speeches that previously 
were inaccessible.”96
¶66  The availability of information on the Internet is a benefit to both legal information 
producers and to the end users (judges, lawyers, and the public). “For information 
producers it is largely a matter of cost and perceived efficiencies of production. For 
consumers it is often a matter of convenience, perceived accessibility, and sometimes 
cost.”97
¶67  The Internet has placed a tremendous amount of materials in the hands of the 
appellate courts. This might mean that courts should be citing to a broader range of 
materials as the materials become more easily accessible. Such a trend would be a shift 
from the norm in the pre-Internet age. One study of state supreme court cases from 1870 
to 1970 found that citation to in-state cases quadrupled over that period of time, while 
citations to other state opinions remained relatively stagnant during that same period.98
As the studies discussed above indicate, the trend is counter to this hypothesis; that is, 
appellate courts are tightening-up their jurisprudence and relying less and less on 
authority that comes from outside their own recent past. Thus, attorneys and judges 
should keep in mind that while a vast array of information is out there, they should 
continue to hone their research skills to retrieve and advocate based primarily on their 
home jurisdiction’s jurisprudence. 
¶68  The Internet has certainly had a huge impact on the way law is practiced. It has 
touched many areas of the law and changed many of the ways law is, and will be, 
practiced. The Internet is pushing the law in many ways, but the evidence revealed by the 
studies in this article suggests we should not let the Internet divert attention away from 
training law students, lawyers, and judges in how to analyze and find relevant precedent 
to persuade courts and build the modern-day jurisprudence. In other words, “how to think 
like a lawyer.” 
95 Badertscher & Melnick, supra note 93, at 17. 
96 Terry Hutchinson, Vale Bunny Watson? Law Librarians, Law Libraries, and Legal Research in 
the Post-Internet Era, 106 L. LIBR. J. 579, 590 (2014). 
97 Badertscher & Melnick, supra note 93, at 17. 
98 Lawrence M. Friedman et al., State Supreme Courts: A Century of Style and Citation, 33 STAN.
L. REV. 773, 797 (1981). One reason posited was that “[t]he tendency to cite more in-state as compared to 
out-of-state cases might reflect the relative decline of common law cases on SSC dockets and the growth of 
statutes as a source of law. In interpreting the statutes of its own state’s legislature, an SSC has less reason 
to consult decisions in other states.” Id.
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¶69  The Internet has pushed the practice of law in many other areas outside of legal 
research. A lawyer would do well to stay abreast of these changes to remain within the 
bounds of his or her ethical obligations within the profession and within his or her 
representation of clients. These areas include everything from how service of process is 
conducted,99 to the places and sources one can conduct discovery,100 to how we conduct 
voir dire and communicate with jurors,101 to the way judges and attorneys interact on 
social media.102 A competent lawyer will make sure to learn these new ways of practicing 
and conform and use these new tools for the benefit of his or her clients. Ultimately, 
however, lawyers should not let the Internet deter them from using the “thinking like a 
lawyer” tools that law school has trained them to use. So what should legal educators do 
to help better prepare law students to research and formulate their legal arguments in the 
Internet Age? 
IV. BEST METHODS FOR LEGAL RESEARCH IN THE INTERNET AGE
¶70  The Internet age has not created a huge shift away from the traditional sources 
relied upon to create appellate jurisprudence. What the Internet age has done is shifted 
where legal researchers seek out these sources. Studies of the research practices of 
lawyers suggest that lawyers are relying less on computer-assisted legal research103 and 
more on free online sources.104 This suggests that law schools need to make sure to train 
law students (and lawyers and judges) how to use these free resources. If appellate courts 
continue to rely most heavily on recent court opinions from within their jurisdiction, then 
legal researcher training needs to be focused on how to uncover these sources and how to 
determine which of these authorities will be most helpful to their clients. It is relatively 
straight forward to introduce law students to the sources of law. This is more akin to legal 
bibliography. More challenging is the continued need to train law students in the skills 
surrounding legal analysis. 
99 See generally Marjorie A. Shields, Annotation, Service of Process Via Computer or Fax, 30 
A.L.R.6th 413 (2008). For a case where service of process via Facebook was upheld, see Baidoo v. Blood 
Dzraku, 5 N.Y.S.3d 709 (N.Y. Sup. Ct. 2015).
100 For a case dealing with discovery requests to access a party’s social media passwords, see 
Howell v. Buckeye Ranch, Inc., No. 2:11–cv–1014, 2012 WL 5265170 (S.D. Ohio Oct. 1, 2012); for 
searching LinkedIn accounts, see Krzyzanowski v. Orkin Exterminating Co., No. C 07-05362 SBA, 2009 
WL 4050674 (N.D. Cal. Nov. 20, 2009). 
101 For a case dealing with jurors and the use of social media, see Sluss v. Ky., 381 S.W.3d 215 
(Ky. 2012); see also Duncan Stark, Juror Investigation: Is In-Courtroom Internet Research Going Too 
Far?, 7 WASH. J.L. TECH & ARTS 93 (2011); J. C. Lundberg, Googling Jurors to Conduct Voir Dire, 8 
WASH. J.L. TECH. & ARTS 123 (2012). 
102 See generally Aurora J. Wilson, Note, Let’s Be Cautious Friends: The Ethical Implications of 
Social Networking for Members of the Judiciary, 7 WASH. J.L. TECH. & ARTS 225 (2012); Emily M. 
Janoski-Haehlen, The Courts Are All A ‘Twitter’: The Implications of Social Media Use in the Courts, 46
VAL. U. L. REV. 45 (2011). 
103 Westlaw, Lexis, Bloomberg, etc. 
104 The ABA’s 2014 Legal Technology Survey Report found that “[o]verall, 51% of lawyers start 
a new research project by turning to a free rather than a fee-based research tool.” Joshua Poje, Legal
Research, at 2, ABA TechReport 2014, http://www.americanbar.org/publications/techreport/2014/legal-
research.html [https://perma.cc/M6A7-MS82].
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¶71  In essence, law schools should double down on training law students to think like 
lawyers.105 “Legal education’s principal purposes should be (and always has been) to 
develop an intellectual understanding of law and legal institutions and the way they work, 
as well as the critical thinking skills that underlie law practice tasks generally.”106
Training law students in these fundamental skills will help them in their research skills as 
they attempt to analyze facts, synthesize principles, interpret texts, and select the best 
precedents to support their clients’ arguments before the court.107
¶72  The Internet and other new technologies continue to evolve and present lawyers 
with new ways to perform legal research. Many articles have been, and will continue to 
be, written about how new research tools are changing the way research is done, but this 
is fluid and will change constantly over time.108 Legal research tools will continue to 
evolve and change, but the essential skill of legal analysis remains constant. 
¶73  As law students, attorneys, and judges turn more and more to search engines to 
locate legal information, the fundamental skill of choosing the most relevant precedent 
will continue to rest with the legal professional.109 No matter how “smart” search engines 
become, “[i]t is unlikely that these search engines will be able to determine the one case 
that is most on point.”110 Lawyers must still possess the necessary skills to determine 
which among the precedents found are the most persuasive and applicable to their client’s 
case. Put another way, “even when lawyers find precedents by means of a computer, they 
rely on their own judgment in deploying it.”111
¶74  The evidence presented in this article supports the argument that the most 
important research skill for an attorney, especially one engaged in appellate work, is to 
master the skill of doctrinal legal research. The Council of Australian Law Deans 
captured the essence of this in a recent statement: 
105 See generally Michelle M. Harner, The Value of “Thinking Like a Lawyer”, 70 MD. L. REV.
390 (2011). 
106 Robert J. Condlin, “Practice Ready Graduates”: A Millennialist Fantasy, 31 TOURO L. REV.
75, 79 (2014). 
107 Id. at 99. 
108 For example, in 2011, Ronald Wheeler published an article examining whether or not the new 
Westlaw platform (WestlawNext) would change the research landscape. Ronald Wheeler, Does
WestlawNext Really Change Everything: The Implications of WestlawNext on Legal Research, 103 L. LIBR.
J. 359 (2011). Four years later Wheeler commented that advances in technology in that short time span had 
him questioning whether his assumptions about research in his earlier work were relevant in the current era 
of electronic legal research. Ronald Wheeler, Is This the Law Library or an Episode of the Jetsons?, 20 J.
LEGAL WRITING INST. 49, 50 (2015). 
109 There are those who do not take this view. In a recent study by law firm management 
consulting firm Altman Weil, 35% of respondents (law firm leaders) “said they could envision replacing 
first-year associates with law-focused computer intelligence within the next five to 10 years. That’s up 
from less than a quarter of respondents who gave the same answer in 2011.” Julie Triedman, Computer vs. 
Lawyer? Many Firm Leaders Expect Computers to Win, AM. LAW. DAILY (Oct. 24, 2015), 
http://www.americanlawyer.com/printerfriendly/id=1202740662236 [https://perma.cc/CBM7-9W72 ]. One 
law firm leader however took those who responded in the positive to task. “K&L Gates chair Peter Kalis 
was skeptical of the survey, noting that many law firm leaders polled by Altman Weil—like the 35% who 
thought first-year associates could be replaced—probably misunderstood the technological requirements of 
true artificial intelligence. ‘One hundred percent of law firm leaders’ Kalis quipped, ‘don’t know anything 
about AI.’” Id.
110 John O. McGinnis and Steven Wasick, Law’s Algorithm, 66 FLA. L. REV. 991, 1018 (2014). 
111 Id. at 1019. 
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Doctrinal research, at its best, involves rigorous analysis and creative 
synthesis, the making of connections between seemingly disparate 
doctrinal strands, and the challenge of extracting general principles from 
an inchoate mass of primary materials. The very notion of “legal 
reasoning” is a subtle and sophisticated jurisprudential concept, a unique 
blend of deduction and induction, that has engaged legal scholars for 
generations, and is a key to understanding the mystique of the legal 
system’s simultaneous achievement of constancy and change, especially in 
the growth and development of the common law.112
¶75  With the wide availability of information, it will be more important than ever for 
researchers to understand what they are looking at. They will need to have a firm grasp 
on analysis so they can determine if the information they are reading is relevant to the 
legal issues they are researching and are not just factual snippets in a universe of near 
limitless information. This concern was highlighted by United States Supreme Court 
Chief Justice Roberts. He has criticized today’s lawyers for relying too heavily on 
research that uncovers facts, not concepts. “Blind reliance on research that focuses 
merely on words, and not on concepts, . . . will uncover reams of marginally relevant 
precedent superficially on point, thereby distracting them from engaging in critical 
analysis or structuring of the underlying legal principles.”113
 With researchers too used to the Google way of researching, legal educators 
should be refocusing and making sure that law students and lawyers are trained to 
understand the benefits and deficiencies with Internet searching. In training law students 
and lawyers in the Internet age, we should focus on teaching critical reading and thinking 
skills and the ability to organize and make sense of the information located. We should be 
focusing on the following questions: 
[U]sers may find a wide range of information, but how well do they 
understand exactly what they have found? Do they know whether it is the 
current law? Do they understand what is missing? Do they recognize 
whether or how well their results answer their original query? Do they 
understand how their results raise new queries altogether? Do they see 
what criteria have been used to judge relevance in the retrieved list? 
Effective legal research still requires a high skill level. Critical thinking 
skills and a refined knowledge of legal materials and sources are 
immensely important in this new environment.114
¶76  This remains an uphill battle. Too often, law students enter law school believing 
they already know how to research. They “think they know how to do research, because 
112 CALD Statement on the Nature of Research, May & Oct. 2005, reprinted in Terry Hutchinson, 
Valé Bunny Watson? Law Librarians, Law Libraries, and Legal Research in the Post-Internet Era, 106 L.
LIBR. J. 579, 585 (2014). 
113 Remarks of the Honorable John G. Roberts, Jr., Chief Justice, Supreme Court of the United 
States, 57 DRAKE L. REV. 1, 9 (2008). 
114 Hutchinson, supra note 96, at 591. 
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it seems so easy.”115 This stands in stark contrast to what lawyers report back to law 
schools. This includes the elite schools. John Palfrey, former professor at Harvard Law 
School, reported that “one of the things I’ve heard from our alumni is that we’re sending 
out too many students into law firm practice who don’t have the best research skills.”116
Palfrey continued: “I don’t want us to send Harvard Law School students out in the world 
thinking that a keyword search is the only—or best—way to look up a statute or to figure 
out where a law journal is.”117
¶77  Academics are not the only ones who believe that research skills remain of high 
importance to new attorneys. In a recent study of 300 hiring partners, 86% of respondents 
believed that legal research skills are of high importance for young associates.118
Additionally, and in keeping with the findings of the studies conducted for this article, 
research competency in case law was found to be most critical above other forms of legal 
research.119 Thus, lawyers and judges must continue to emphasize to their alma maters 
that training law students in these skills will be of the most benefit to them and their 
clients when they begin to practice law. 
CONCLUSION
A law student being trained to think within the structures created by 
Langdell and West but who locates, accesses, and manipulates law 
using electronic means, cannot help but be confused and 
disconcerted by the disconnect between the two modes of 
thinking.120
¶78  Although it might be true that accessing law in an electronic format requires 
different tools or techniques, the resources sought are essentially, as this paper’s study 
shows, the same material that lawyers and judges from different generations used to 
create their eras’ jurisprudence. 
¶79  The challenge for the Internet-age lawyer, judge, and law student is to bridge this 
gap through a steady diet of learning how to “think like a lawyer.” Internet-age 
jurisprudence is built solidly on the recent appellate opinions of the court’s jurisdiction. 
As such, honing one’s analytical skills to be able to zero in on the most relevant cases, 
and using these cases to persuade a court on behalf of one’s client, will work for the 
Internet-age lawyer in the same fashion that worked in the pre-Internet age. 
 The Internet has not dramatically changed the predominant form of authority 
upon which courts base their opinions. The Internet has, perhaps, made judicial opinions 
much richer with more citations to authority from various jurisdictions and secondary 
sources. Future surveys of citations will tell the tale as to whether this will change more 
115 Richard A. Danner, S. Blair Kauffman & John G. Palfrey, The Twenty-First Century Law 
Library, 101 L. LIBR. J. 143, 146 (2009). 
116 Id. at 147. 
117 Id. at 146. 
118 LEXISNEXIS, WHITE PAPER: HIRING PARTNERS REVEAL NEW ATTORNEY READINESS FOR REAL
WORLD PRACTICE 3, http://www.lexisnexis.com/documents/pdf/20150325064926_large.pdf
[https://perma.cc/9MBC-BDXS ]. 
119 Id. at 4. 
120 Valentine, supra note 10, at 196. 
N O R T H W E S T E R N  J O U R N A L  O F  T E C H N O L O G Y  A N D  I N T E L L E C T U A L  P R O P E R T Y  [ 2 0 1 7
 280
dramatically than is currently in practice. One thing that appears not to change is, as 
science historian George Dyson explained, “Information is cheap, but meaning is 
expensive. Where is the meaning? Only human beings can tell you where it is.”121 As a 
result, it is imperative that law schools do not abandon their core function: training law 
students to “think like a lawyer.” 
121 George Dyson, Information Is Cheap, Meaning Is Expensive, EUROPEAN (Oct. 17, 2011), 
http://www.theeuropean-magazine.com/352-dyson-george/353-evolution-and-innovation 
[https://perma.cc/M8Q2-4W4V]. 
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Appendix A 
TOTAL SUPREME COURT SOURCES CITED 2012 TERM OPINIONS 
Cited Source Majority Concurrence Dissent 
SCOTUS 1992-2012 470 54 148
SCOTUS 1991-prior 545 45 183
Fed. C.A. 1992-2012 223 7 44
Fed. C.A. 1991-prior 51 3 21
Fed. Dist. 1992-2012 15 0 4
Fed. Dist. 1991-prior 12 1 5
State 1992-2012 96 0 26
State 1991-prior 52 1 7
Fed. Admin 12 0 3
Legal Journals 27 16 31
Legal Sources 47 9 29
Non-Legal Sources 70 30 67
Internet 22 2 13 
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Appendix B 
TOTAL CALIFORNIA SUPREME COURT SOURCES CITED IN 2014 
OPINIONS
Cited Source Majority Concurrence Dissent 
Cal. S.Ct. 2004-2014 1321 13 25
Cal. S.Ct. 2003-prior 1246 28 27
Cal. Lower courts 
2004-2014
157 10 6 
Cal. Lower courts 
2003-prior
235 8 31 
U.S.S.Ct. 2004-2014 127 7 3
U.S.S.Ct. 2003-prior 368 21 30
Fed. C.A. 2004-2014 41 11 4
Fed. C.A. 2003-prior 53 7 18
Fed. Dist. 2004-2014 20 1 0
Fed. Dist. 2003-prior 4 1 0
State 2004-2014  47 8 25
State 2003-prior 55 3 39
Legal Journals 33 5 11
Legal Sources 16 0 2
Non-Legal Sources 4 0 2
Internet 15 0 1 
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Appendix C 
2014 California Supreme Court Citations to Law Journals 
Top 20 21–50 51–100 Below 
14 9 4 22 
2012 United States Supreme Court Citations to Law Journals 
Top 20 21–50 51–100 Below 
34 10 6 24 
Each citation to a law journal was compared to the Washington and Lee University’s Law 
Journals and Submissions Ranking, 2007–2014, http://lawlib.wlu.edu/LJ/index.aspx. For 
the chart above, each article cited to was categorized as ranking within the top twenty 
ranked journals, between the twenty-first and fiftieth ranked journals, between the fifty-
first and 100th ranked journals, or 101st and below. 
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